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Introduction
The information and communication technology sector has played and will continue playing a pivotal role in transforming the economy by boosting more rapid growth and productivity gains (OECD, 2001; . In this context, small high-technology firms are seen as engines of economic growth, trying to derive their profits from international activities right from their inception (Oviatt and McDougall, 2005) . At the same time, these high-growth hightechnology ventures resemble the firms usually venture capitalists (VCs) will back: they are small, young, and in industries characterised by high risk and uncertainty (Bloodgood et al., 1996) .
The burst of the dot.com bubble demonstrated once more that businesses built around hightechnology product innovations are dramatically unstable (Slywotzky and Wise 2002) . It also supported earlier assertions that stable growth continues to be both very rare and poorly understood (Vinnell and Hamilton, 1999) , and that substantial growth is seemingly a rather exceptional process (Storey, 2002; Carter et al., 2004) . For example, as Carter et al. (2004) found, with years in business, growth objectives of small firms decrease incrementally, while ambitions for closure, sale, succession or remaining the same size increase incrementally.
In venture-backed firms the growth objectives of VCs on one hand and entrepreneurs on the other may become the source of tensions between the two (Cable and Shane, 1997; De Clercq and Sapienza, 2006) . For example, driven by "dominant logic" (Bettis and Prahalad, 1995) , VC"s are attracted to high-growth ventures because of the potential for very high gains in combination with the availability of early exit strategies (Petty, 1997) . On the other hand, entrepreneurs might want to focus on profitability via a long-term growth. The dilemma then for entrepreneurs is whether to agree with VCs" strategy that is focused on early exit or insist on the strategy that is long-term and profitability oriented. These divergent objectives may lead to disagreements over the direction of the development of the firm (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001 ).
The degree to which exchange partners" goals and values converge is referred to as goal congruence (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998) . The importance of goal congruence to the success 3 of a venture has been widely acknowledged (Cable and Shane, 1997; Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2001; De Clercq and Sapienza, 2006; Parhankangas et al., 2005) . The literature to date however has considered to a great extent the relationship between VC and entrepreneur as a "black box" (De Clercq and Manigart, 2007) , and little is know about the long-term outcomes of the aspects of these relationships (Busenitz et al., 2004) . This paper makes an attempt to half-open this "black box" by exploring the dyadic tensions between VCs and entrepreneurs that emerge post-investment with a specific focus on critical events in the course of de-internationalisation of small software companies. Grounded in data, the paper will propose a typology of goal alignment to explain the issues of congruence over ends and means in venture-backed firms. The data emerged from an exploratory case study research that used critical incident technique to data collection, analysis, and interpretation. Directions for future research will be provided.
Entrepreneur-VC relationship
Two broad streams of research form the current enquiry into the post-investment relationship between entrepreneur and VC: research with focus on value added and monitoring activities by venture capitalists (for review, see De Clercq and Manigart, 2007) . De Clercq and Manigart (2007) maintain that although these two types of activities overlap, their underlying assumptions are quite different. The research on value added focuses primarily on VCs" nonfinancial efforts (social capital, business and legal knowledge, active participation, strategic information) to increase the value of their investment after the investment decision has been made (Manigart et al., 2002; Busenitz et al., 2004; Florin, 2005; Makela and Maula, 2005; Wiltbank, 2005; Berglund et al., 2007) . The research on value added by VCs beyond their financial involvement is in its early stage (Busenitz, 2007) , and its findings so far are somehow inconsistent (DeClerq and Manigart, 2007) and mixed (see for example, Busenitz et al., 2004; Florin, 2005; Mäkelä and Maula, 2005) . The sampling bias towards more success stories built in the research design is seen as one of the reasons for the inconsistency of the findings (Manigart et al., 2002; De Clercq and Manigart, 2007) . The present research feels in this gap by exploring longitudinally the relationships between VCs and entrepreneurs in 4 critical situations that deviate negatively 1 from what is normal or expected (Edvardsson, 1992) .
The research on monitoring focuses on VCs" attempts to pre-empt and correct potential harmful behaviour by entrepreneurs (Sapienza and Korsgaard, 1996; Bruton et al., 2000; Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2001; Parhankangas et al., 2005) . Trust and control, as Shepherd and Zacharakis (2001) (Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2001 ; see also Sapienza and Korsgaard, 1996; De Clercq and Sapienza, 2006) . Contractual control rights are the primary means through which VCs address the potential for opportunism and disagreements (Barney et al., 1994; Parhankangas et al., 2005) . Some of other common government means of VCs include: serving on a new venture"s board of directors (Gabrielsson and Huse, 2002; Berglund et al., 2007) ; frequency of face-to-face communication with entrepreneurs De Clercq and Fried, 2005; Makela and Maula, 2005) , and dismissal (Fiet et al., 1997; Bruton et al., 2000) .
In venture-backed firms the growth objectives of VCs and entrepreneurs may become the source of potential disagreement between the two. For example, VC"s are attracted to highgrowth ventures because of the potential for very high gains in combination with the availability of early exit strategies (Petty, 1997) . Pursuing quick exit, VCs may pressure the entrepreneur to seek short-term profits even to the detriment of long-term profitability. They are inclined to take companies public near market peaks, even if this is not necessarily the optimal timing for the new venture (Lerner, 1994) . On the other hand, entrepreneurs might want to focus on profitability via a long-term growth. The dilemma then for entrepreneurs is whether to agree with VCs" strategy that is focused on early exit or insist on the strategy that is long-term and profitability oriented.
The research also shows that VCs may seek a premature initial public offering (IPO) in their portfolio investments in order to gain reputation (Gompers, 1996) . The research also suggests that VCs may refrain an entrepreneur from bringing the new venture to a next growth stage by under-investing in it (De Clercq and Manigart, 2007) . Such allocation of capital may be 5 more detrimental for the entrepreneur than for the VC since the latter can spread the investment risk across multiple portfolio companies; this might lead to conflicts with the interests of individual portfolio firms (Mäkelä and Maula, 2005) .
The research on procedural justice may shed some light on goal alignment between VCs and entrepreneurs. Procedural justice theory is concerned with individuals" reactions to decisions in which they are personally invested but that they cannot directly or fully control (Sapienza and Korsgaard, 1996) . That is, when a direct control over a decision is not possible, individuals value just procedures because they provide a means to indirect control over that decision. Tyler (1989) put forward three factors that determine procedural justice judgements:
standing, neutrality, and trust. Standing denotes one"s status in a relationship that provides an opportunity to speak forthrightly. The opportunity to refute someone"s comments and defend one"s point of view may indeed be beneficial for aligning each other"s goals. Neutrality implies an impartial treatment with respect to other ventures in a VC"s portfolio. VCs will seek best information from entrepreneurs to make decisions that affect the respective venture.
And trust reflects an assurance of the predictability of someone else"s actions. Research in this area suggests that procedural justice is an important determinant of investors" attitudes and behaviours (Sapienza and Korsgaard, 1996) , and that it is positively associated with longterm venture performance, which suggests that the relationship between VCs and entrepreneur may be well served by establishing procedures to ensure fairness and efficient information exchange (Busenitz et al., 2004) .
In the case of high-technology new ventures, in the early stages of the rollout of a new technology the market signals are not reliable (Coltman et al., 2001; OECD, 2001) . The need for strategic goal alignment becomes even more critical and more difficult to attain in such situations when an industry is not clearly established and lacks legitimacy (Mäkelä and Maula, 2005) . Questions of relevant performance benchmarks arise (Lovallo and Kahnemann, 2003) . Both entrepreneurs and VCs are learning and adjusting their behaviour as the industry emerges (Valliere and Peterson, 2005) . As argued by Fredrickson (1984) , a more complex or turbulent environment requires less rationality. One might expect to observe higher tensions in entrepreneur-VC relationships in critical situations when there is a negative deviation from what is believed to be normal or expected.
These high-technology companies, using venture capital, are internationalising at or right after their inception, and are expecting to deliver high returns to their backers. These expectations were not always met however. Companies for example would deinternationalise as a result of critical incidents that were emanating either from outside or inside the firm. The decision over the course of action at such critical points might effect higher tensions between VCs and entrepreneurs. For instance, the entrepreneur would consider the choice between completely or partial withdrawal from a foreign market, whereas the VC would consider the option between further committing resources or closing the company down. As maintained by De Clercq and Manigart (2007) , this type of goal congruence in terms of how autonomous the entrepreneur can be in making decisions over the strategic direction of the company is of a very different nature and calls for different action, which in turn presents a further route for fruitful research.
The importance of goal congruence to the success of a venture has been widely acknowledged (Bruton et al., 2000; Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2001; de Clercq and Sapienza, 2006; Parhankangas et al., 2005) , yet the literature todate has considered to a great extent the relationship between VC and entrepreneur as a "black box" (De Clercq and Manigart, 2007) , and little is know about the long-term outcomes of the aspects of these relationships (Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2001; Busenitz et al., 2004) . This paper makes an attempt to halfopen this "black box" by exploring the dyadic tensions between VCs and entrepreneurs that 7 emerge post-investment with a specific focus on critical events in the course of deinternationalisation 2 of small software companies.
Research methodology
For the purpose of this study, the critical incident technique (CIT) methodology was employed. The traditional CIT has its origins in the research undertaken by Flanagan (1954) .
On the assumption of a positivist approach to social science, he defined incident as any observable human activity that is sufficiently complete in itself to permit inferences and predictions to be made about the person performing the act. To be critical, Flanagan argues that an incident must occur in a situation where the purpose or intent of the act seems fairly clear to the observer and where its consequences are sufficiently definite to leave little doubt concerning its effects. The definition of CIT has somewhat changed over the years to take into account changes in assumptions about ontology, methodology, and human nature.
Taking into account the above changes, Chell (1998: 56) defined CIT as a qualitative interview procedure that facilitates the investigation of significant occurrences (events, incidents, processes or issues) identified by respondent, the way they are managed, and the outcomes in terms of perceived effects.
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One of the challenges when studying critical events is to minimize the attribution errorswhen people tend to misattribute the cause of the events (Lovallo and Kahneman, 2003) .
According to Lovallo and Kahneman (2003) , the typical pattern of such attribution errors is for people to take credit for positive outcomes and to attribute negative outcomes to external factors, no matter what their true cause. Several sampling strategies were employed to minimise the effect of such attribution errors, hence to increase the construct validly of the research. One strategy was to control for the effect of the external environment (e.g. legislation, market size, market structure across industries and countries, effect of time) on selected cases. The firms were selected from the same location and observed during the same time period. The other strategy was to minimize the potential effect of resource bias; small being defined as a company having less than 100 employees (Storey, 1994 4 A fifth case was added to the research that matched all the above selection criteria but one: it did not raise venture capital in order to internationalise. Table 1 provides a brief summary of the cases. For confidentiality reasons, interviewees" and companies" names are disguised throughout the paper. 
Data collection and triangulation
Data triangulation also helped minimize the attribution errors by corroborating the data collected from entrepreneurs via the data collected from their stakeholders and other sources (figure 1). The information about the critical incidents that led to de-internationalisation was collected primarily from three data sources: (i) secondary sources; (ii) in-depth interviews with companies" directors; and (iii) in-depth interviews with companies" stakeholders.
Twenty-four interviews, including follow-ups, were conducted with company directors and their stakeholders, yielding approximately 150 pages of interview data.
Figure 1 about here

Secondary sources of data
Thorough preparations before entering the field work are pivotal especially when studying critical events. An opportunity to get access to an entrepreneur with such experience might be unique, and therefore as much as possible shall be learned about the entrepreneur and the company before the interview. The use of secondary data was seen then to satisfy four key aims. First was to detect potential cases on the bases of selection criteria. Second, to learn as much as possible about a company and its history prior to the actual interview with its director. Third, to compare and cross-check written and published evidence with what interview respondents reported. And fourth, to identify potential stakeholders who could 9 corroborate the consistency of information reported by interviewees. Databases were created for each case to organize and document data collected, thus contributing to the enhancement of the reliability of the research. As the research unfolded, primary data was added to the databases as well.
Interviews with entrepreneurs
To explore critical incidents in the case companies, CIT guidelines for in-depth interviewing were followed, namely, (i) indicate to the interviewee the authority on which the interview is being held; (ii) make a statement about the purpose of the study; (iii) explain why the interviewee has been chosen to comment; (iv) convince the interviewee of the anonymity of the data; (v) the main question should state that an incident or actual behaviour is desired; (vi) allow the interviewee to do most of the talking and avoid asking leading questions; (vii) control the interview, by probing the incidents and clarifying one"s understanding; (viii) ask follow-up questions to ensure that a comprehensive and detailed account has been given; (ix) conclude the interview; and (x) take care of ethical issues (Chell, 1998; Flanagan, 1954) .
The interviews were conducted with entrepreneurs who were responsible for and implemented de-internationalisation decisions. The average interview lasted approximately sixty minutes. All interviews were recorded with interviewee"s permission, and transcribed verbatim immediately after. The interviews were semi-structured in the form of guided conversations. Critical incident technique method guidelines were followed; namely, the interviewee was allowed to do most of the talking, leading questions were avoided, and open ended questions, followed by appropriately worded probing questions, were employed. To ensure some comparativeness between the responses, and allow sufficient control over the interview to ensure that the research objectives were met, an interview guide was designed.
Interviews with company stakeholders
The aim of interviewing companies" stakeholders was threefold. First, to corroborate data derived from the interviews with entrepreneurs. Second, to capture their own experience and understanding in relation to critical events such as de-internationalisation, including their 10 attitudes towards failed companies. And third, to request their help in identifying potential companies for the study. Chiefly, companies" stakeholders were represented by their investors, liquidators, strategic advisors, policy makers, and business correspondents. The average interview lasted approximately sixty minutes. All interviews were recorded with interviewee"s permission and transcribed verbatim. The same approach and principles to design the interview guide with entrepreneurs were used to design the interview guide with stakeholders, including the negotiation of the getting back option of returning for further follow-up research.
Data analysis
Once an interview was transcribed, it was transferred to QSR NVivo programme that handles qualitative data analysis research projects. The interview transcripts and secondary data pertinent to each case were coded in an iterative manner, working back and forth between theory, emerging patterns and data. Within-and cross-case analyses were employed to analyse the data. Within-case analysis was the basis for developing early constructs surrounding the critical events in the process of de-internationalisation, like for example agility and hype. The exploration and description of each case was centred on critical events and started from the inception of the company. A time line of critical events, an international path, and a time line of revenue and employment (actual and projected) were generated for each case. Quotes from interviews were used extensively to illustrate the events, incidents, processes and issues that had, to various degrees, an impact on the entrepreneurs" decisions to de-internationalise. According to Dubin (1969) , the very essence of description is to name the properties of things, and the more adequate the description, the greater the likelihood that the concepts derived from the description will be useful in subsequent theory building.
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The "de-internationalisation project" in NVivo was structured around a matrix format that represents the list of events for each case (Miles and Huberman, 1994) . According to Miles and Huberman (1994) , this approach to within-data analysis allows a good look at what led to what, when and why. The content of the "event listing" matrix emerged after the initial "free
coding" or open coding (Glaser, 1978) for each case was completed, and each case was explored and described in detail using the event listing matrix. According to Weick (1989: 521) , middle-range theories are solutions to problems that contain a limited number of assumptions and considerable accuracy and detail in the problem specification. The method of constructing typologies by reduction (Glaser, 1978) was employed to advance middle-range theory of dyadic tensions between entrepreneur and VCs.
Grounded in data, figure 2 presents the typology of goal alignment that was generated by cross-tabulating entrepreneurs" agenda and VCs" agenda. Four types of alignment emerged:
life changing opportunity (quadrant I); enslavement (quadrant II); no marriage (quadrant III);
and illusive alignment (IV). The concept of goal alignment is unidirectional; it is geared towards the VCs" agenda of a quick exit. Next section will discuss the typology in detail. 
Typology of goal alignment
Dyadic tensions at inception
Regardless of what business model and growth path a firm adopts in its efforts to develop and market its product, it faces three generic questions with regards to internationalisation: how fast to internationalise, what entry mode to adopt, and what market to target. To the above, VC backed firms, before addressing the above strategic issues, have to alleviate the tensions that might appear as the result of differences in the entrepreneurs" and the VCs" goals. For example, on one side, entrepreneurs want to achieve profitability via long-term growth,
whereas VCs" goals are to exit quickly. The dilemma then is whether to focus on long-term growth or early exit strategy. As several interviewees explained:
'VCs' nature is that they need an exit point. This is how they make their money -only on the exits. Therefore it is not good to them to have a management team that wants to build a perfect company over 20 years' -the liquidator;
'VCs want out as fast as they can. The minute they buy your share, their only concern is whom they are going to sell their shares to. Short-term profit is not a priority item. It does not matter at all. These are the dippiest, darkest secrets of the VC world' -the business strategy consultant.
The data further suggests that VCs agenda is driven by the life cycle of their investment portfolio. By and large, VCs will raise a ten year fund. By year three VCs will invest the money, by year seven they would be looking to get the returns, and by year ten they would have exited from all the portfolios, and returned funds to their investors. That imposes pressure on entrepreneurs to conform to that sort of cycle.
This dominant logic (Bettis and Prahalad, 1995) Hence, as venture capital comes in, it pushes the growth forward, and it starts to climb the value curve. The ideal time for VCs to exit is when the internal rate of return that measures the investment retirement is at its highest value; usually within three or five years after the investment was made. It follows therefore that within a maximum of three to five years from an investment, VCs will look to exit.
The ideal situation for VCs and entrepreneurs is when their agendas are aligned, and this creates a life changing opportunity attitude so that entrepreneurs share the VCs" desire for a quick exit (quadrant I, figure 2). These days, when according to one VC "…the number of deals are low, and doing deals becomes harder", it is even more crucial to create that life changing opportunity attitude so that management teams share VCs" desire for exit. As several interviewees explained: In this situation of illusive alignment of goals (quadrant IV, figure 2), for VCs it is easier to mitigate the effect of getting an investment, which is when entrepreneurs "lose control"
having actually retained the majority of the shares, by making entrepreneurs believe they are in control of the situation as long as they unknowingly and reflexively advocate VCs" agenda.
As several interviewees noted: To the above differences in the views over the foreign market entry strategies, the marketing non-executive director, whom Project-Software hired, insisted on selling the product into Europe via a master distributor -a strategy that was never supported by co-founders, but that 16 was eventually adopted by them to avoid the conflict with the investors. For entrepreneurs this is a catch-22 situation: they can not or do not want to say "no" as they for example (i) are desperate to get funding in order to develop and/or market their product, or (ii) lack sufficient knowledge and experience to argue their case, or (iii) are trying to avoid the situation when they could be blamed for the firm"s failure when things go wrong. As the CEO of Project-Software explained:
'If we did not carry the strategy through, it could backfire and looked like it was our fault and we did not achieve the sales that we hoped we would. And of course we could then have had a difficult argument to make because it would be hard to justify that our decision was right when every one else felt it was
wrong' -the CEO of Project-Software.
By saying "yes" to something they do not agree with, i.e. by enslavement (quadrant II, figure   2 ), entrepreneurs force themselves into a conflict situation, which they have to live with for the remainder of their marriage with VCs. As the CEO of Project-Software noted:
'We felt incredibly frustrated, stressful. This conflict gives you a sense that you've lost control of something that you used to view as yours. We lost control of the pace, as the investors dictated the pace of the growth… I think they were stifling the growth of our company, rather than helping it grow' -
the CEO of Project-Software.
If a consensus is not found to alleviate these dyadic tensions as quickly as possible, dissatisfaction with the deal will continue amplifying, and will inevitably lead to a divorce. In the case of internationalised firms, the enslavement may lead to de-internationalisation or any other critical events.
Dyadic tensions at critical juncture
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Once internationalised, the questions that most need to be addressed by entrepreneurs are: to what extent is the chosen internationalisation strategy continuing to deliver returns and positive performance, and if less than optimal, what change would better effect attainment of projected targets (Turcan, 2003) . In VC backed firms the ability to make the change happen in the light of negative feedback depends on how agile entrepreneurs are in their decision making process. Agility was a recurrent pattern throughout the data analysis (table 3) .
Grounded in data, agility is about flexible decision making and a flexible cost base structure that allow decision makers (entrepreneurs and VCs) to scale up and more importantly to scale down according to the activity level that the firm is experiencing. The data analysis suggests that the degree of goal alignment would determine the extent of agility. Table 3 about here For example, the co-founders of Project-Software, who were enslaved (quadrant II, figure 2,) and who were in conflict with their investors (who imposed a lot of decisions upon them, and with which co-founders did not agree), had the perception that they not only lost control of the company and their agility in decision making, but also that "VCs were stifling the growth of the company, rather than helping it to grow". It all started when VCs conditioned their participation in the venture by asking the co-founders to change their business plan that, as one of the co-founders put it, '… did not look ambitious enough'. Continuous commitments of resources to that ambitious plan during the downturn in the IT market, as well as the cumbersome decision making process, had the same effect on co-founders" perceptions of VCs" and their role to the company performance. As the CEO of Project-Software recalled: (Brockner, 1992) . Entrepreneurs who had VC backing exhibited this kind of behaviour, escalated their commitment to the failing course of action. Despite the fact that in the second half of 2000 the IT market in the US started to collapse and that the same started happening in the UK one year later, the entrepreneurs got trapped in, what in hindsight was to become, a failing course of action and kept committing resources.
For example, co-founders of Project-Software, being in a conflict with their investors continued investing organisational resources trying to boost sales in the diminishing US market in order to meet the projected targets. Co-founders of Data-Software having their growth strategy aligned to VCs" strategy, i.e. to develop the company as fast as possible (albeit without being aware of VCs" ultimate exit objectives) continued this strategy and opened another two overseas offices, and were making plans to double the workforce over the next year. As co-founders of these firms stated: The investors, however, "…spooked by the intentions of the strategic partner" -as the lead entrepreneur described the situation, disagreed and decided to pull completely out of the US and focus on applications instead. The lead entrepreneur left and a new CEO was brought in to implement the VCs" survival strategy. The new CEO failed, however, to save the company either through a refinancing or sale, and Data-Software was put up for voluntary liquidation.
In autumn of 2001, Data-Software ceased trading. In the same vain, Busenitz et al. (2004) found that a dismissal of an entrepreneur or the entire team by a VC is negatively related to the performance of the venture exits. Had the passion and knowledge of the lead entrepreneur been preserved (Cusumano (2004) , things might have been different as their then strategic partner had not fulfilled its hyped intentions.
Conclusion
According to a business strategy consultant, "…the strongest company is the one which forms the best relationships with its investors". In the same vein, Bygrave and Timmons (1991) argue that the ongoing cooperative relationship between entrepreneurs and VCs is more important to the performance of ventures than the provision of venture capital itself. Cable and Shane (1997) ten years later demonstrated that the cooperation between entrepreneurs 20 and VCs is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for the successful post-investment performance of VC backed start-ups. Therefore, aligning the goals of entrepreneurs to VCs" goals, and vice versa, may be the first step towards building those strong mutual relationships. To understand these dyadic relationships between entrepreneurs" and VCs" goals, the typology of goal alignment was introduced that is unidirectional and geared towards the VCs" agenda of quick exit. Four types of goal alignment emerged (see figure 2 ):
(i) life changing opportunity; (ii) enslavement; (iii) no marriage; and (iv) illusive alignment.
The ideal situation for VCs and entrepreneurs is when their agendas are aligned, and this creates a life changing opportunity attitude so that entrepreneurs share the VCs" desire for a quick exit. This life changing opportunity attitude is based on the assumption that what is good for VC is good for entrepreneur; an assumption that shall be treated with cautiousness The goal congruence over the growth objectives of the venture at the start-up is not enough, as the data further suggests, to ensure life changing opportunity behaviour from entrepreneurs and to avoid tensions with their backers. For example, there might be a consensus over the goals of the portfolio company. However, VCs and entrepreneurs may disagree on the ways and directions of the efforts of achieving them. Sapienza and Gupta (1994) termed this type of agency problem as good faith disagreements. They argue that in emerging industries the signals from the markets regarding the best course of action are generally weak and VCs tend to question CEO"s efforts to prioritise the operating goals. Hence not only an agreement over the goals of the venture is critical, but also over the ways of getting there.
Over time, as learning curve improves, VCs" and entrepreneurs" goals might converge (Sheppard and Sherman, 1998) and dominant logic (re-)established (Bettis and Prahalad, 21 1995). Bettis and Prahalad (1995) warn however, that the dominant logic changes slowly and rarely in the absence of a crisis; in case of a crisis it tends to depart. As the case of DataSoftware suggests, the dominant logic changed in the moment of crisis "…VCs always said yes, until we suggested going down a different route" that led to dismissal of the founder CEO and eventual liquidation of the company.
Entrepreneurs may be however kept in the dark with regard to the VCs" true agenda and will follow it believing their goals coincide with VCs goals; this is a situation of an illusive alignment. In this situation, VCs do not have to even insist on their objective of early exit as entrepreneurs unknowingly and maybe reflexively, for example, driven by hype, "share"
VCs" desire for quick exit. In this situation of illusive alignment of goals, for VCs it is easier to mitigate the effect of getting an investment, which is when entrepreneurs "lose control"
having actually retained the majority of the shares, by making entrepreneurs believe they are in control of the situation as long as they unknowingly and reflexively advocate the VCs" agenda.
The construct of illusive alignment of goals addresses earlier criticism (Cable and Shane, 1997) and extends extant research in that it allows incorporating the possibility of opportunistic behaviour by VC, i.e. viewing VC as agent. In this regard, the findings by McKaskill et al. (2004) are quite interesting. In their quest to develop an exit readiness index, they found that nearly two-thirds of Australian investors and 60% of US investors do not clearly indicate their exit preferences. This, according to McKaskill et al. (2004) , introduces inefficiencies and confusion on the part of the firms seeking equity.
When VCs and entrepreneurs do not reach a compromise over the goals and strategies of a portfolio company, then there will be no marriage between the two. However, entrepreneurs find themselves enslaved when they can not or do not want to say "no" to VCs agenda as they for example are desperate to get funding in order to develop and/or market their product, or lack sufficient knowledge and experience to argue their case, or are trying to avoid the situation where they could be blamed for the firm"s failure when things go wrong.
Entrepreneurs may find themselves in a catch-22 situation. By saying "yes" to something they 22 do not agree with, i.e. by enslavement, entrepreneurs force themselves into a conflict situation, which they then have to live with for the remainder of their marriage to VCs.
The enslavement construct is based on the assumption that there should be at least some sort of good-faith agreement between VCs and entrepreneurs; otherwise there will be no marriage. As the case of Project-Software indicates, founding entrepreneurs and VCs had similar views on the need to enter the US market; however, they held different views on when they should enter the EU market. VCs insisted on entering EU market at same time as entering the US market; founding entrepreneurs regarded the entry to the EU market as premature step and favoured more incremental approach to internationalisation. The effect of entering US and EU markets simultaneously proved to be fatal for the portfolio company.
Similar findings could be found in Mäkelä and Maula (2005) who found that by exerting isomorphic pressure on entrepreneurs, VCs were driving the portfolio company to internationalise to "incorrect" markets (Mäkelä and Maula, 2005; original emphasis, p. 240) .
Future research directions
The typology of goal alignment poses interesting questions for future research. For example, Cope et al., 2004) . The issue of stigma of failure becomes even more acute in countries like Scotland, in which all the sample firms started their activities, where the VCs" community and the advisors" community are very small, and susceptible to collusion.
As the concept of goal alignment is unidirectional, that is, it is geared towards the VCs" agenda of quick exit, it might be expected that the ultimate bargaining power over decision making process will reside with the investors. Hence, the goal alignment gives scope to negotiated autonomy -a negotiated freedom to make and implement decisions. As De Clercq and Manigart (2007) posit, possible goal conflict between the VC and entrepreneur may pertain more to how autonomous the entrepreneur can be in terms of the strategic direction in which the portfolio company is going. Hence,
P2: In firms that acquire venture capital the level of autonomy will depend on the degree of alignment of goals between VCs and entrepreneurs.
When VCs" and entrepreneurs" agendas are aligned, it might be inferred that entrepreneurs will have a higher degree of negotiated autonomy, will be more entrepreneurially oriented, and thus achieve higher performance, relative to the situations when the alignment of entrepreneurs" goals to VCs" goals is not explicit (enslavement or illusive alignment P4. Firms with a higher degree of negotiated autonomy will be more entrepreneurially oriented, and therefore will achieve higher performance.
In companies with no venture capital and who opt for organic growth, one might expect that entrepreneurs will have a true autonomy -a complete freedom to make key decisions, and implement them. 
FinanceSoftware
While working for the parent company, we had a number of approaches from external organizations to see if we could do some work for them.
The parent company announced that it wanted to reduce the overall headcount in its overseas R&D unit.
We bought-out the R&D lab and immediately went international
The opportunity we identified was not longer in demand
We realised that we were operating without any focus and started incurring losses
Services did not travel; we need a classic USP, a product
Employing bottom-up approach, we identified new market opportunities Key issues were whom to partner with and which vertical to go
We focused entirely on the UK market and grew very rapidly
Launched the first version of the product
We found that our product was at least 12 months too early
We decided to reduce the costs of the company down to the point where we can keep it going forever, and in doing that we own the IP
ProjectSoftware
Consulting on object technology, we realised that there were no automated mechanisms, and thought it would be really nice to have a product that did this
We started R&D activities and launched the first version of the product via a deal with an OEM
The OEM deal was short-lived
We managed to gain control of the product, re-brand it, and started own sales
Pitched to VCs to raise funds to market the product in the UK, maybe to Europe
VCs said this was a daft strategy, asked to change the plan to reflect immediate international expansion to US because the vast majority of IT sales were in US We started exporting to US IT market stated to collapse, but we continued exporting
We received second round, and abandoned hopes for Europe
VCs appointed a non-exec specialised in crisis management
We signed a joint venture deal with a large UK MNE that had a large customer base
We developed a plan to cocoon and presented it to the investors The plan was not accepted by one investor
We approached the liquidator to surrender
We bought over the IP form the liquidator, re-branded it, and launched its first version
ToolSoftware
After wining a service project in smartcard technology and successfully delivering it, we were left with the software, and we decided to create a tool
We launched the first version of the tool via an OEM and took it to Europe
We tried to raise venture capital, but with no success Smart-card technology started being adopted globally
We took our product to US, and opened our first office over there
We moved to profitability
We won a strategic contract with one of the largest software player in the world
The recession of the IT market started
Our strategic partner withdrew from the smart-card market, and from our strategic partnership
We realised that the opportunity we were pursuing was not realizing
We laid-off half of staff, and restructured the overseas offices, and decided to focus back on 2G tools and services business to generate tactical revenue
We spotted new opportunity to develop a 3G smart-card platform for telecom and finance sectors
We received first round of funding to develop the platform, followed soon after by the second round of funding
We expanded to Japan where we opened our second overseas office When we received third round of funding, the platform was already released We held the board meeting with the investors to re-evaluate the business plan: no changes were made IT market started to worsen in the UK We were behind planned revenues and with the development of the platform
We held next board meeting and decided to raise another £9 million
One investor pulled-out from the deal, another was acquired by another, larger investor and also pulled-out
We could not find another investors, and soon after the company ceased to trade
DataSoftware
Through consulting services, we developed IP as to how to make the process of data mining rapid
Backed-up by VCs we bought-out that IP and small R&D team from a large software company
International dimension was forced upon us from the very beginning, and we started exploring various routes to US market Failed to secure a strategic partnership with one of the leading companies in the field Soon after the start-up, we achieved brake through in product development
After another failure to secure a strategic partnership with a market leader in business intelligence, finally we managed to secure a strategic partnership with one of the largest software companies
We received 2nd round of funding to build sales infrastructures in the US We opened first two overseas sales office in the US close to our strategic partner IT market in the US started to collapse I refuted several offers from trade buyers Our strategic partner announced market development plans that overlapped with ours, and spooked by that event, VCs started thinking and talking as to what to do Meantime we opened another two sales offices in the US, and adhered to the strategy of fast, out-and-out growth IT market started to worsen in the UK Decision was reached to focus on profitability rather than on out-and-out growth It was also decided to withdraw from the US, and focus on applications rather than products, and on direct selling in UK only 
